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INTRODUCTION

In substantive criminal law in 1980 the Tennessee Supreme
Court allowed inferences drawn from surrounding circumstances
to sustain charges of homicide' and of fraudulent drawing of bad
checks.2 In the law of defenses, the court in Kennamore v.
State rejected the "true man" rule of self-defense and in State
v. Jones4 declared entrapment to be a defense in Tennessee. In
procedural matters, the Tennessee Supreme Court applied the
right to counsel to preliminary hearings," clarified the State's
burden of proof after a showing that jury separation was potentially prejudicial,6 and discussed various constitutional issues
arising in the fair cross-section requirement, the multiple offender rule,8 the right to counsel aspects of confessions,' and the
Tennessee Habitual Criminal Act.10
During the same period the United States Supreme Court

1.
2.
3.
supra.
4.
supra.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See text accompanying notes 21-33 supra.
See text accompanying notes 39-42 supra.
604 S.W.2d 856 (Tenn. 1980). See text accompanying notes 43-53
598 S.W.2d 209 (Tenn. 1980). See text accompanying notes 54-62
See text accompanying notes 125-37 supra.
See text accompanying notes 221-30 supra.
See text accompanying notes 205-20 supra.
See text accompanying notes 256-62 supra.
See text accompanying notes 158-62 supra.
See text accompanying notes 236-39 supra.
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struggled to clarify seizure under the rule in Terry v. Ohio" and
interrogation under the rule in Miranda v. Arizona." The high
Court also addressed the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement, 5 the propriety of searching individuals
found on premises for which a search warrant had been issued," '
the admissibility of suppressed evidence for cross-examination
impeachment purposes,1 ' the conflict of interest problems raised
by representing multiple defendants," and the constitutional
standard of effectiveness for retained counsel.' The United
States Supreme Court reaffirmed the reasonableness limits of
electronic surveillance orders," disapproved government action
that appeared to retaliate against an accused who was exercising
his constitutional rights," and sustained the power of the legislature to establish criminal punishments.' 0

I.

OFFENSES

A.

Homicide

1. Murder
A conviction for first degree murder requires proof of premeditation, except when the prosecution relies on the felony
murder theory." Premeditation may be difficult to prove, however, when there are no witnesses to the crime. This difficulty is
illustrated in the case of Houston v. State."2 The defendant in
Houston was accused of the first degree murder of a service station operator, who was shot three times during an attempted
robbery. Instead of using the felony murder theory and avoiding
the need to prove premeditation, the prosecution had elected to
392 U.S. 1 (1968). See text accompanying notes 63-89 supra.
384 U.S. 436 (1966). See text accompanying notes 163-77 supra.
See text accompanying notes 90-99 supra.
See text accompanying notes 100-09 supra.
See text accompanying notes 114-24 supra.
See text accompanying notes 143-47 supra.
See text accompanying notes 138-42 supra.
See text accompanying notes 148-52 aupra.
See text accompanying notes 187-204 aupra.
See text accompanying notes 231-35 supra.
21. TRNN. Cons ANN. 1 39-2402 (Supp. 1980).
22. 593 S.W.2d 267 (Tenn. 1980).
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
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nolle prosequi the felony murder count and to proceed on the
remaining counts of common-law murder and armed robbery.SS
The defendant in Houston was convicted, and his conviction was
sustained on the authority of prior cases that inferred premeditation from repeated blows.24 Justice Henry, dissenting, conceded that while evidence of repeated blows normally could satisfy the premeditation requirement, the only other evidence of
the manner of the killing in this case came from the defendant's
confession.2 If the defendant's testimony that the pistol had
fired when he and the victim were wrestling was believed, a finding of premeditation was excluded. The jury could separate the
defendant's statement and choose to believe the accused's confession to the crime, but disbelieve his rendition of the details as
self-serving. Since the confession was the only direct evidence of
murder26 and since presumably a conviction could not have resulted without the confession, the dissent found "it difficult...
to give full faith and credit to [defendant's] admission that he
killed and robbed the victim and simultaneously to reject out-ofhand his explanation of all details favorable to him"'1 7 especially
since the defendant had received the death penalty. The dissent
preferred to reduce the conviction to second degree murder and
the sentence to life imprisonment.'
Malice, an essential element of second degree murder, has
been implied more freely in vehicular homicide cases in Tennessee than in other jurisdictions.' 9 In Farr v.State30 the accused
had driven his truck across a bridge at a speed of twenty-five to
thirty miles per hour. While attempting a necessary ninetydegree turn at the end of the bridge, defendant's door flew open

23. State v. Bullington, 532 S.W.2d 556 (Tenn. 1976); Franks v. State,
187 Tenn. 174, 213 S.W.2d 105 (1948).
24. 593 S.W.2d at 279 (Henry, J., dissenting).
25. Id. (Henry, J., dissenting).
26. Id. (Henry, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 280 (Henry, J., dissenting).

28. Id. (Henry, J., dissenting).
29. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 541 S.W.2d 417 (Tenn. 1976); Stagg" v.
State, 210 Tenn. 175, 357 S.W.2d 52 (1962); Eager v. State, 205 Tenn. 156, 325
S.W.2d 815 (1959); Edwards v. State, 202 Tenn. 393, 304 S.W.2d 500 (1957);
Tarvers v. State, 90 Tenn. 45, 16 S.W. 1041 (1891).
30. 591 S.W.2d 449 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979).
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and he fell from the truck. The passenger in the vehicle was unable to regain control, and the vehicle ran over and killed a bystander. 1 The accused was arrested for driving while intoxicated
and for reckless driving.32 The evidence included testimony from
the investigating officer and from the defendant's ex-wife that
he had been intoxicated, that his truck was in poor condition,
and that he was aware that the doors were likely to come open.
The court of criminal appeals found sufficient evidence of malice, even without considering defendant's intoxication. The court
concluded that defendant's operation of the truck "implied such
as to amount
a high degree of conscious and wilful recklessness
8SS
to that malignity of heart constituting malice.
2. Involuntary Manslaughter
Involuntary manslaughter, an unintentional killing caused
by an unlawful act,'" was the crime involved in Hemby v.
State.'s The defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in the death of his infant child under the theory that, while
in a drunken stupor, he fell asleep on a bed with the child, rolled
over, and smothered the child to death. The county medical
examiner testified that his findings would be consistent with
death resulting either from smothering or from "sudden infant
death syndrome-or 'crib death'-wherein a previously healthy
baby, with perhaps at most a history of the sniffles, dies suddenly and unexpectedly, and the autopsy reveals nothing more
than hypoxia."' 6 The defendant contended that when two causes
of death are equally possible, and the defendant would not be
responsible under one cause, then he cannot be found guilty.37
The court responded that the inconclusiveness of the clinical evidence could be eliminated by evidence of the case history and
the circumstances surrounding the infant's death. Thus, the
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
1979).
36.
37.

Id. at 450.
id.
Id. at 451.

§ 39-2409 (1975).
589 S.W.2d 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied, id. (Tenn.

TRNN. CODE ANN.

Id. at 926.
Id. at 927.
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court in Hemby found sufficient evidence from which the jury
could conclude "that this infant's death was caused by smothering brought about by the defendant overlaying its tiny body. '"
B. Bad Check Law
The use of computer technology to perpetrate fraud arose in
the case of State v. Denami.-" The accused was convicted of two
counts of drawing a check with insufficient funds.40 He had requested a branch bank official to cash a check for $15,500 drawn
on his account. Because of the large amount of money involved
and because he did not know the accused, the bank official dialed the bank's computer and requested a mark-up of the check,
which resulted in a hold for the amount against the contingent
balance of the account.4 ' Although the computer accepted the
hold, the bank official remained suspicious and requested the
book balance-the balance at the end of the previous
day-which was zero. The official declined to cash the check and
suggested that the accused go to the bank's main office to check
on his account. Minutes later, the accused was successful in similar efforts at a different branch bank where he received $5,000
in cash and a $10,500 cashier's check. On the third attempt at
another branch bank, the accused was taken into custody.
The accused had worked at the bank in its data programming department, and prior to the date of the fraudulent transactions, he had instructed tellers on the use of the computer.
While the computer indicated an excess of $78,000 in contingent
funds, the account actually had no balance. The accused's be-

38. Id.
39. 594 S.W.2d 747 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979), appeal denied, id. (Tenn.

1980).
40. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1959 (Supp. 1980).
41. The contingent balance shows the amount in the account at a particular time during the day, including any deposit the customer has made during
that day, if he requested that it be "marked up," so that those funds are available for withdrawal during the same day. This contingent balance survives only
until the end of the banking day, when it is superseded by the book balance-an amount ascertained by the bank's bookkeeping department from actual physical records of transactions. In other words, the contingent balance is
valid beyond one day only if the bank receives proof that funds were deposited
to match the amount shown in the contingent balance. 595 S.W.2d at 748.
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havior afforded sufficient proof that he was aware of that fact, 2
and thus, the court concluded that the jury was warranted in
finding that the checks were delivered with fraudulent intent.
III. DEFENSES
A. Self-Defense
In State v. Kennamore" the court addressed the issue
whether the victim of an unprovoked assault was obliged to retreat before resorting to self-defense, or, in the unfortunate language used by the court, "whether the so-called 'true man' rule
of self-defense should be adopted in this state."" The accused

was kneeling to add fuel to a campfire when the deceased struck
him on the head with a soft drink bottle and caused him serious
injury."" A witness testified that the accused immediately attacked the deceased and that the witness had pulled the two
apart. The accused then ran to his truck, took a shotgun from it,
and shot the deceased who, some twenty to twenty-five feet
away, was suffering the effects of the beating. The accused testified that the deceased had kicked him after hitting him with the
bottle and that his pleas for help to the witness went unanswered. Fearing further attack, the accused seized the shotgun
and fired in self-defense. The accused was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, the accused challenged the trial
court's refusal to give a requested jury instruction regarding circumstances that do not require retreat when one is threatened
by a deadly assault."
42. Additionally, a search of the accused's automobile had turned up
some 15 or 20 checks, cut by a check protector, each in the amount of $15,500,
and a page from the telephone directory listing at] the branch offices of the
bank. Id. at 749.
43. 604 S.W.2d 856 (Tenn. 1980).
44. Id. at 857.
45. "Appellant sustained a scalp laceration three or four inches in length,
which required extensive sutures, and he was hospitalized for about four days
following the incident." Id.
46. The requested instruction stated:
"If the defendant when assaulted was without fault and in a place
where he had a right to be and was placed in reasonable apparent
danger of losing his life or of receiving great bodily harm, he need not
retreat, hut may stand his ground, and repel force by force, and if, in
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At common law the victim of such an assault was required
to retreat if it was reasonable to do so, except when the assault
occurred in the victim's own home' 7 or when the victim was executing an official duty." A minority of jurisdictions, however,
hold that as a general rule there is no obligation to retreat from
a deadly assault.4 ' The Tennessee Supreme Court concluded

that this minority rule should not be adopted; rather, "the availability of an avenue of retreat and the practicability of using
it"'" were factors to be considered in determining if self-defense
was asserted legitimately. The court proposed the following instruction on the issue of retreat:
The law of excusable homicide requires that the defendant
must have employed all means reasonably in his power, consistent with his own safety, to avoid danger and avert the necessity of taking another's life. This requirement includes the
duty to retreat, if, and, to the extent, that it can be done in
1
safety.'

While the instruction would appear to have no exception, the
Kennarnore opinion noted Morrison v. State," a case that recognized no duty to retreat. Thus, the Kennamore court concluded
that the decision should be limited "to the defense of one's
house or habitation, "" a caveat that presumably will be added
the reasonable exercise of his right of self-defense, he kills his assail-

ant, he is justified and should be acquitted."
Id. at 858.
47. State v. Foutch, 96 Tenn. (12 Pickle) 242, 247, 34 S.W. 1, 2 (1896);
Fitzgerald v. State, 1 Tenn. Cases (Shannon) 505, 510 (1875).
48.

2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW

49.

See generally R.

AND

PROCmEDUR § 126 (14th ed. 1979).

MORELAND, LAW OF HOMICIDE

259 (1952). See also

Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80 (1877); State v. Bartlett, 170 Mo.658, 71 S.W. 148
(1902); Erwin v. Ohio, 29 Ohio St. 187 (1876).
50. 604 S.W.2d at 859.
51. Id. at 860.
52. 212 Tenn. 633, 371 S,W,2d 441 (1963).
53. 604 S.W.2d at 859.
Justice Henry, dissenting, noted that in the present case the court of criminal appeals had correctly noted that Morrison "does not limit the application
of the retreat doctrine to the home. It adopts the broad general proposition
that one who is where he has a lawful right to be is under no duty to retreat
and then treats the particular proposition of a specific place." Id. at 860-61
(Henry, J., dissenting). See also Kendrick, Criminal Law and Procedure-1963
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to the above instruction when appropriate.
B. Entrapment
Tennessee is the only jurisdiction in the United States
that does not recognize the defense of entrapment. More accurately, it is the only jurisdiction that professes that the defense
is not recognized. With this opinion we bring our secession to a
close and reconstruct our decisional law so as to bring it into
harmony with that of our sister states and of the federal
system.
From this day forward entrapment is a defense to a
Tennessee criminal prosecution."
Thus Justice Henry, speaking for a unanimous court, parted
from precedent in State v. Jones. 6 The court tentatively
adopted the subjective test" for entrapment:
[E]ntrapment occurs when law enforcement officials, acting either directly or through an agent, induce or persuade an otherwise unwilling person to commit an unlawful act; however,
where a person is predisposed to commit an offense, the fact
that the law enforcement officials or their agents merely afford

Tennessee Survey, 17

VAND.

L. Rav. 977, 979 (1964). While not arguing against

the retreat rule, Justice Henry maintained that the accused was entitled to an
explication of the law regarding retreat, even without a special request:
The jury should have been charged that there must be an available, safe and effective avenue of retreat; that there must have been
ample time; that defendant's physical and mental condition were factors that should be taken into consideration; that consideration must
be given to all the circumstances as they reasonably and honestly appeared to the defendant; and that the whole transaction should be
looked to as a series of events. Moreover, the jury should have been
instructed that all factors should be considered in the light of the fact
that failure to retreat is a circumstance to be considered, along with
all others, in order to determine whether the defendant went further
than he was justified in doing and that a failure to retreat is not categorical proof of guilt. This is a fair resume of the holdings of our
courts.
Id. at 862 (Henry, J., dissenting).
54. State v. Jones, 598 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Tenn. 1980).
55. Id. at 209.
56. See id. at 220.
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an opportunity does not constitute entrapment.51
This subjective standard was qualified to the extent that "outrageous police behavior" or "over-involvement" could render predisposition irrelevant."
Because entrapment is an affirmative defense, the burden of
proof rests upon the accused to establish a prima facie case."
Once entrapment is shown, the burden shifts to the prosecution
to prove predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt.60 Predisposition may be shown by evidence of prior crimes of a similar character and by the reputation of the accused.'
Ironically, the Jones court concluded that the defense of entrapment was unavailing in the case at hand, which involved solicitation to commit robbery. The court reasoned that entrapment was logically impossible when the charge was solicitation
since the gist of solicitation is the volitional act of the accused.
Therefore, "[olne may not be solicited into soliciting. He is either the solicitor or the solicitee. If the former, he may not be
the latter.""
IV.
A.

PROCEDUP
Arrest

1. What Constitutes a Seizure
A fourth amendment liberty interest is not implicated unless the party raising the issue is detained against his or her
will. If, for example, a suspect voluntarily accompanies an officer to the stationhouse, no arrest occurs." Whether the actions
57.
58.
(Powell,
(1973)).
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id. (citing Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 492-93 (1976)
J., concurring) and United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-33

Id. at 220.
Id.
Id,
Id. at 221.
63. See generally J. CooK, CONsTrrUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE Accusnm-Pa-TiAw RIGHTS j 12 (1972) [hereinafter cited as COOK, PaN-TmAL
RIGHTSJ.

64. See Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102 (1969), remanding for a determination, inter alia, whether an arrest had in fact occurred.
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of the suspect were actually voluntary may be difficult to determine if the suspect claims an absence of any real choice. "6 In
United States v. Mendenhall" federal narcotics agents observed
the accused disembark from an airplane. After noting that her
behavior fit the "drug courier profile '7"-"an informally compiled abstract of characteristics thought typical of persons carrying illicit drugs"s-one agent approached the accused and requested to see her identification and airline ticket. The
identification and ticket bore different names, and the accused's
only explanation for the difference was that she "just felt like
using that name.'"" When the agent declared his official identity, the accused became very nervous. Her ticket and identification were retained, and she was asked to accompany the agent to
the airport Drug Enforcement Administration office about fifty
feet away for further questioning. There, the agent asked if the
accused would allow a search of her person and handbag, but
advised her that she could refuse permission. The accused responded, "Go ahead,"70 and a female police officer, after being
assured by the accused of her consent, carried out the body
search. In the course of this search, two packages of heroin were
found in the accused's undergarments. The accused was convicted of possession with intent to distribute heroin.
The district court denied a motion to suppress the evidence
by reasoning that the initial detention was a permissible investigative stop under the standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio71
and that the accused's subsequent conduct was voluntary and
consensual. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit re65. See Cook, Subjective Attitudes of Arrester and Arrestee as Affecting
Occurrence of Arrest, 19 KAN. L. Rnv. 173 (1971).
66. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
67. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has previously wrestled with the legitimacy of the profile. See United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977).
68. 446 U.S. at 547 n.1. The factors impressing the agents were (1) arrival
from Los Angeles, from which came much of the heroin to Detroit; (2) last off
the plane and nervous appearance; (3) no baggage claimed; and (4) a change of
airlines for a flight out of Detroit. Id.
69. Id. at 548.
70. Id.
71. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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versed"' finding its decision in United States v. McCaleb" to be
controlling. In the McCaleb case the court had disapproved the
use of the drug courier profile and had characterized a similar
confrontation as an arrest without probable cause. Thus, the
McCaleb court invalidated the subsequent consent search as the
fruit of an illegal detention."
In an opinion written by Justice Stewart, the Supreme
Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Mendenhall. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, first concluded that
under Terry and its progeny "a person is 'seized' only when by
means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of
movement is restrained;""1 further, the fourth amendment is implicated "only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave. "76 Applying this standard, no seizure of
the accused had occurred: "[N]othing in the record suggests that
the respondent had any objective reason to believe that she was
not free to end the conversation in the concourse and proceed on
her way . . . .' It was not essential that the accused be told
expressly that she need not cooperate, 7 ' nor did her behavior,
although it was inconsistent with her self-interest, imply that
she had acted under compulsion.7
Notably, not only did the four dissenting justices" take issue with this reasoning, but an additional three justices,6 ' while
concurring with the result in Mendenhall, declined to join this
portion of the opinion. The concurrence instead preferred to as72. United States v. Mendenhall, 596 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1979),
73. 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977).
74. Id.

75. 446 U.S. at 553.
76. Id. at 554.
77. Id. at 555.
78. Compare Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
79. 446 U.S. at 557-58. The Court stated: "It may happen that a person
makes statements to law enforcement officials that he later regrets, but the
issue in such cases is not whether the statement was self-protective, but rather
whether it was made voluntarily." Id. at 555-56.
80. Id. at 566 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was joined by Jus.
tices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 560 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
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sume that, while there was a seizure, the circumstances were sufficiently suspicious to justify it."' Justice Powell, speaking for
the concurring Justices, noted that he did "not necessarily disagree with the views expressed" in this portion of the opinion,
but that "the question whether the respondent in this case
reasonably could have thought she was free to 'walk away' when
asked by two government agents for her driver's license and
ticket is extremely close."' Thus, this portion of the opinion
would appear to be dubious precedent.
The Court then turned to the contention that, irrespective
of the impropriety of the initial confrontation, the accused's
fourth amendment rights were violated when she was accompanied to the Drug Enforcement Administration office. On this
contention the Court found adequate support for the district
court's conclusion that the accused voluntarily consented to the
further detention. Because the detention was not unlawful, the
Court only needed to determine whether the search was consensual. Again, the Court found ample support for the district
court's conclusion. First, the Court noted that the accused, a
twenty-two year old with an eleventh grade education, was capable of giving a knowing consent. Second, the accused had been
advised twice by the officers of her right to decline consent; this
"substantially lessened the probability that their conduct could
reasonably have appeared to her to be coercive.""
The Mendenhall issue was again presented in Reid v.
Georgia,80 in which narcotics agents in an airport observed the
accused carrying a shoulder bag and occasionally looking back at
another man who was carrying a similar shoulder bag. The two
met in the lobby, spoke briefly, and left the terminal together.
The agent approached them outside, asked to see their ticket
stubs and identifications, and requested them to consent to a
search. The accused initially agreed to the search but then broke
and ran, dropping the shoulder bag, which contained heroin.
The state appellate court held that the initial detention was
reasonable, because the suspect fit the agent's "drug courier pro-

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 561-66 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 560 n.1. (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 559.
448 U.S. 438 (1980).
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file." 8 6 This profile did not satisfy a majority of the Supreme
Court, who found that the observed behavior was insufficiently
suspicious and that "[tjhe other circumstances describe a very
large category of presumably innocent travellers, who would be
subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to conclude
that as little foundation as there was in this case could justify a
seizure."87
In a concurring opinion Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, agreed that the seizure was
not justified but noted that, as in MendenhaU, the question
whether there was a seizure at all had not been addressed;" that
issue remained open for consideration by the lower court on remand. Justice Rehnquist, relying upon his position in Mendenhall, maintained that there had been no seizure, and therefore
no fourth amendment rights were implicated."'
2.

Warrant Requirement

The United States Supreme Court has long held that a warrant is not required for a felony arrest when the arresting officer
has probable cause.9 0 In recent years, however, the Court has
suggested that a warrant might be required if officers entered
residential premises to make the arrest and no exigent circumstances were present." In United States v. Watson" the Court
86. State v. Reid, 149 Ga. App. 85, 255 S.E.2d 71 (1979).
Specifically, the court thought it relevant that (1) the petitioner had
arrived from Fort Lauderdale, which the agent testified is a principal
place of origin of cocaine sold elsewhere in the country, (2) the peti-

tioner arrived in the early morning, when law enforcement activity is
diminished, (3) he and his companion appeared to the agent to be
trying to conceal the fact that they were travelling together, and (4)
they apparently had no luggage other than their shoulder bags.
448 U.S. at 440-41.

87. Id. at 441.
88. Id. at 442-43 (Powell, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
90. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
91. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The Court
noted that
It is clear .

.

. that the notion that the warrantless entry of a

man's house in order to arrest him on probable cause is per se legitimate is in fundamental conflict with the basic principle of Fourth
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rejected defendant's contention that officers should have obtained an arrest warrant since they had ample opportunity to do
so, emphasizing the fact that the arrest was made in a public
place.' 3 The following year in United States v. Santana" the
Supreme Court sustained a warrantless arrest within a dwelling,
but only because the arrestee had retreated when the officers approached, and thus, the entry was made in hot pursuit.'5 The
issue of warrantless arrests in residential premises finally was
addressed directly in Payton v.New York." Having assembled
ample evidence to establish probable cause, six officers went to
defendant Payton's house early in the morning. When no one
answered the door, the officers sought additional assistance and
used crowbars to break into and enter the apartment. The officers found no one on the premises, but did locate and seize a
shell casing that was in plain view. The shell casing was admitted into evidence at the defendant's trial. 7 The Supreme Court
held that the evidence was illegally seized because the entry had
not been made pursuant to a warrant and because no exigent
circumstances justified forgoing the warrant requirement." The
Court added that since an arrest warrant would be a sufficient
authorization to enter the suspect's dwelling when there is reason to believe he or she is within, a search warrant would not be
required."

Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a man's house without warrants are per se unreasonable in the absence of some one of a
number of well defined "exigent circumstances."
Id. at 477-78.
92. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
93. Id. at 424.
94. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
95. Id. at 42-43.
96. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist, dissented. Id. at 603 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
Rehnquist also dissented separately. Id. at 620 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
97, Id. at 576-77.
98, Id. at 602.
99, In Carroll the Court stated the general rule to be that "a police officer may arrest without warrant one believed by the officer upon reasonable
cause to have been guilty of a felony .. " Id. at 156.
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B. Search and Seizure
1. Execution of Search Warrants
In Ybarra v. IlLinoisW the propriety of searching individuals who were on premises for which a search warrant had been
issued came before the Supreme Court. A warrant authorized
the search of a tavern and of its bartender for heroin and related
evidence. In executing the warrant, nine of the thirteen customers were frisked, ostensibly for weapons. During the frisks what
was described by an officer as "a cigarette pack with objects in
it"1" was detected, removed from defendant's pocket, and found

to contain packets of heroin.' 0 ' The defendant was convicted for
possession.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground
that the search violated the fourth amendment. 1" Nothing in
the complaint on which the warrant was issued suggested that
patrons of the tavern might be in possession of seizable evidence. Furthermore, nothing observed at the tavern when the
officers arrived to execute the warrant provided probable cause
to believe that the defendant held seizable items. Therefore, the
Court concluded, the warrant gave the officers "no authority
whatever to invade the constitutional protections possessed individually by the tavern's customers. " ""
The prosecution alternatively argued that the defendant
was legitimately subject to a Terry frisk and that the risk provided probable cause to believe he was in possession of narcotics.106 Because the Court found no basis for suspecting that the
defendant was armed, the frisk was improper from the outset."
The Court was unimpressed by the argument that the Terry
power should be expanded to permit evidence searches of individuals found on premises subject to a search warrant when the
police had suspected those individuals of involvement in drug
100. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 88.
People v. Ybarra, 58 Ill. App. 3d 57, 373 N.E.2d 1013 (1978).
444 U.S. at 96.
Id. at 92.
Id.
Id. at 92-93.
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trafficking.1 0 7 The Court cited United States v.Di Re,'0 8 which
held that an individual who was seated in an automobile with a
suspect who was believed to possess illegal contraband did not
forfeit his fourth amendment protection.'10 An even stronger
argument could be made in Ybarra that the presence of the accused in a public tavern carried no implication of suspicion.
2.

Incident to Arrest

The power to carry out a warrantless search incident to an
arrest was limited significantly in United States v. Chadwick." 0
The Chadwick Court precluded the search of a locked foot
locker which was seized within the parameters of Chimel v. California."' Although Chimel allowed the search of an arrested
person and items within his immediate control, the Court reasoned that a greater privacy interest attached to the closed
container in Chadwick. In United States v. Montano"' the accused was arrested in a motel room for a narcotics offense. During the arrest a suitcase was observed protruding from under the
bed. An officer opened the suitcase and found $40,000 and several bags of cocaine. The Sixth Circuit, finding no probability
that the suitcase might have been opened by one of the suspects
to procure a weapon or to destroy evidence, concluded that the
search was unreasonable under Chadwick. Judge Weick, dissenting, maintained that the officers "justifiably feared a potentially
dangerous situation as they entered the motel room," and it was
therefore "reasonable for the agents to act quickly to secure the
premises and eliminate any opportunity for either escape or for
the use of weapons,"'"
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 94.

332 U.S. 581 (1948).
Id. at 587.
433 U.S. 1 (1977).

111. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
112. 613 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1980).
113. Id. at 159 (Weick, J., dissenting).
The majority charged the dissent with attempting to alter the rules for a
valid search by reference to the crime under investigation and the common use
of weapons in connection therewith. It noted that the Supreme Court had
declined a similar opportunity in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), in
which a so-called murder scene exception to the warrant requirement was in-
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3.

Illegally Seized Evidence as Impeachment

Although Mapp v. Ohio1" prohibits the introduction of illegally seized evidence and its fruits, the Supreme Court has held
that such evidence is admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching the testimony of the accused.' 1 ' In Walder v. United
States" ' the accused asserted on direct examination that he had
never dealt in or possessed any narcotics. For impeachment purposes the prosecution introduced narcotics that were illegally
seized from the premises of the accused. The Walder Court
noted first that since the evidence introduced was not substantively relevant to the pending charges, the question whether the
jury could limit its consideration of the evidence to the question
of credibility was logically, though perhaps not actually, absent. "' The Court also noted that since the accused had made
the challenged statement on direct examination, the prosecution
had not intentionally created an opportunity to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence. "
Both of these qualifications noted in Walder were repudiated by the Court in subsequent decisions. In Harris v. New
York," a case involving the introduction of a confession obtained in violation of Miranda, the Court dismissed the collateral evidence aspect of Walder as immaterial to the holding.
Likewise, the significance of the second factor was repudiated in
United States v. Havens. 10 Havens had accompanied McLeroth
on a flight from Peru to Miami. At the end of the flight a customs officer found cocaine sewed into makeshift pockets in
McLeroth's t-shirt. McLeroth implicated the defendant, and
thereafter a search of defendant's luggage revealed a t-shirt from
which pieces had been cut that matched those sewn into McLeroth's shirt. This evidence was suppressed prior to the defendant's trial. McLeroth pleaded guilty and alleged in his testivalidated.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

613 F.2d at 150.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
See COOK, PRE-TRIAL RIGHTS, supra note 63, § 73.

347 U.S. 62 (1954).
Id. at 65.
Id.at 65-66.
401 U.S. 222 (1971).
446 U.S. 620 (1980). See generally 48

TENN.

L. Rav. 721 (1981).
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mony that the defendant had devised the means for transporting
the cocaine and had sewn the pockets shut. The defendant denied any involvement and was asked on cross-examination if he
had anything to do with the makeshift pockets in McLeroth's tshirt. He denied that he had and further denied that the t-shirt
from which the pieces were cut was in his luggage. The t-shirt
taken from defendant's luggage subsequently was admitted for
purposes of impeaching the defendant's credibility. While conceding that the precedents had not involved false testimony first
given on cross-examination, a majority of the Court held nevertheless that "the reasoning of those cases controls this one.""
Four Justices dissented 1 22 and noted that prior to Walder the
Court had held in Agneflo v. United States'" that it was constitutionally impermissible to use illegally seized evidence to rebut
statements of the accused made during cross-examination.'"
4. Electronic Surveillance
Beginning with Katz v. United States"" the Supreme Court
required prior judicial authorization in virtually all electronic interceptions of conversations. Whether this authority applied to
the use of electronic tracking devices was the issue in United
States v. Bailey.126 Undercover narcotics agents had arranged to
sell an ingredient for a controlled substance to a suspect. Prior
to delivery, the agents obtained a warrant from a federal magistrate which authorized the installation of an electronic beeper in
one of the drums of chemicals to aid in tracking the container to
the manufacturer. Sometime after the location of the drum was
confirmed by the emitted radio signals, the agents obtained a
second warrant for the seizure of the device and the chemicals.

121. Id. at 626.
122. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Stewart, and Stevens
dissented. Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
124. The majority sought to explain away Agnello as "a case of crossexamination having too tenuous a connection with any subject opened upon
direct examination to permit impeachment by tainted evidence." United States
v. Havens, 446 U.S. at 625.
125. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
126. 628 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1980).
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At the trial for conspiracy to manufacture narcotics, evidence
obtained by use of the electronic tracking device was excluded
because the warrant contained no time limitation.
In affirming the ruling, the court of appeals found that installing the device in the container, which was then in the lawful
possession of the government, did not violate the fourth amendment since no reasonable privacy interest of the accused was violated. A different result was reached, however, with regard to
the monitoring of the beeper's signal since that occurred after
ownership and possession had been transferred to the accused.
The court concluded that "[bleeper surveillance of non-contraband personal property in private areas trenches upon legitimate
expectations of privacy .... "1127
While a warrant had been obtained for the surveillance,
thus raising a presumption of validity, the question remained
whether the warrant was itself adequate. The court of appeals
agreed with the district court that, under the authority of Berger
v. New York,'" an electronic surveillance order must contain
reasonable time limitations, and that absent such specifications,
the warrant was rendered invalid." '
C. Right to Counsel
1. Preliminary Hearing
In the 1974 decision of McKeldin v.State3 0 the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that the right to counsel applied to preliminary hearings and that the state must provide counsel for an
accused indigent at the preliminary hearing.'3 1 The court recognized, however, that the failure to provide counsel might be
harmless error."'3 When the error was determined in subsequent

127. Id. at 944.
128. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
129. In a concurring opinion, Judge Keith favored an explicit recognition
by the court "that privacy of movement is protected by the Fourth Amendment." 628 F.2d at 949 (Keith, J., concurring).
130. 516 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1974).
131. See Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1974: A Critical Survey,
42 TENN. L. REv. 187, 220-22 (1975).
132. 516 S.W.2d at 87.
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proceedings to be harmless, 83 the accused petitioned for a federal writ of habeas corpus.'" McKeldin, charged with armed
robbery, had been represented at his preliminary hearing by
court-appointed counsel who was not a licensed attorney. Thereafter, he retained a licensed attorney to represent him at trial
and was convicted and sentenced to twenty years. Three issues
were raised on appeal: (I) whether the accused was entitled to
counsel at his preliminary hearing; (2) if so, whether a courtappointed nonlawyer satisfied that entitlement; and (3) if not,
whether the error was harmless.
The federal constitutional standard, established in Coleman
v. Alabama,' s" made the dispositive factor whether under state
law the preliminary hearing was regarded as a critical stage of
the prosecution. While the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had
held that Coleman would not apply to a preliminary hearing in
Tennessee, s3 in McKeldin v. Rose, the habeas corpus proceeding, the federal district court found that precedent dubious for
two reasons:" s7 first, the case would have required a retrospective
application of Coleman, and second, the preliminary hearing
statute had been replaced, and unlike the old statute, the new
one required a preliminary hearing in all cases upon the request
of the accused.'" Because of the change in the law, the Sixth
Circuit accepted the Tennessee Supreme Court decision in McKeldin v. State that the preliminary hearing was a critical stage
in the prosecution. Having determined that the right to counsel
applied, the court had no difficulty in concluding that the right
was not satisfied by the appointment of a nonlawyer."'
The court then turned to the harmless error issue and

133. McKeldin v. State, 534 S.W.2d 131 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
134. McKeldin v. Rose, 482 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
135. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
136. Harris v. Neil, 437 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1971).
137. 482 F. Supp. at 1096.
138. TENN. Cone ANN. § 40-1131 (1971). Under the old law, the right to a
preliminary hearing attached only when the grand jury was not in session. 482
F. Supp. at 1096.
139. The court, in reaching its conclusion, relied on Harrison v. United
States, 387 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir, 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 392 U.S. 219
(1968). 482 F. Supp. at 1096.
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looked for guidance to Holloway v.Arkansas,"' a case decided
subsequent to McKeldin v. State. In Holloway the court said
that
the assistance of counsel is among those "constitutional rights
so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated
as harmless error." . . . Accordingly, when a defendant is de-

prived of the presence and assistance of his attorney, either
throughout the prosecution or during a critical stage in, at
least, the prosecution of a capital offense, reversal is
automatic. 4'
In McKeldin v.Rose the district court expanded the reasoning
of Holloway to hold that "when a defendant is denied assistance
of counsel at a critical stage of the prosecution it cannot be
treated as harmless error." ' ' Thus, at least in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, the harmless error exception to the McKeldin rule is inapplicable.
2. Effective Assistance of Retained Counsel
Lower courts often have disagreed on whether the standard
for effective assistance of counsel is affected by whether counsel
is appointed or retained. Many courts took the view that the
same standard should apply in all cases. 48 Other courts, however, concluded that greater deference must be shown to retained counsel since by selecting the attorney, the defendant, to
a degree, has endorsed the work of counsel.14 Still other courts
held that retained counsel could never be incompetent for sixth
amendment purposes, because there was no governmental action.145 The question finally was answered in Cuyler v.Sulli140. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
141. Id. at 489 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967))
(citation omitted).
142. 482 F. Supp. at 1098.
143, E.g., Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1979); Goodwin
v. Cardwell, 432 F.2d 521 (6th Cir. 1970); McLaughlin v. Royster, 346 F. Supp.
297 (E.D. Va. 1972).
144. E.g., Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 866 (1965); Stewart v. Wainwright, 309 F. Supp. 1023 (M.D. Fla. 1969);
Williams v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 691 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
145. E.g., Plaskett v. Page, 439 F.2d 770 (10th Cir. 1971); United States
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in which the United States Supreme Court concluded

that defendants who retain counsel are entitled to the same
degree of constitutional protection against ineffective assistance
as are those defendants who are represented by appointed
counsel. 47
3.

Conflict of Interest

Two other issues before the Supreme Court in Cuyler v.
Sullivan148 were issues that were expressly reserved in Holloway
v. Arkansas.14 ' The Court had to decide whether a state judge

must inquire into the propriety of multiple representation when
the question has not been raised by one of the parties and
whether the mere possibility of a conflict of interest is sufficient
to find a deprivation of the right to counsel. On the first issue,
the Court held that the sixth amendment does not require that
trial courts consider the propriety of multiple representations in
every case. Given the ethical obligation of the attorney to avoid
conflicts of interest and to advise the court whenever they arise,
trial courts could assume that no conflict existed or that the parties affected had waived any objection absent the existence of
special circumstances.15 0 On the second issue, the Court concluded that except in cases in which a defendant was not given
an opportunity to show the potential conflict, a reviewing court
should not presume that a possible conflict resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel.' If the issue is raised at trial, the
ex rel. O'Brien v. Maroney, 423 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1970); Shaw v. Henderson,
303 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. La. 1969), afJ'd, 430 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1970).
146. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
147. The vital guarantee of the Sixth Amendment would stand for
little if the often uninformed decision to retain a particular lawyer
could reduce or forfeit the defendant's entitlement to constitutional
protection. Since the State's conduct of a criminal trial itself implicates the state in the defendant's conviction, we see no basis for draw-

ing a distinction between retained and appointed counsel that would
deny equal justice to defendants who must choose their own lawyers.

Id. at 344-45 (footnotes omitted).
148.
149.
150.
151.

435 U.S. 475 (1978).
446 U.S. 335 (1980).
Id. at-346-47.
Id. at 348.
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defendant should be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate
the conflict. If no objection is made at trial, then on appeal the
defendant "must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest
adversely affected his lawyer's performance."15
D. Identifications
In Summitt v. Bordenkircher'"lthe issue for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was whether due process required a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the admissibility of identification evidence. While acknowledging that
such a procedure would be preferable, the court was persuaded
that there was no such constitutional requirement." Although
the Supreme Court had held that a trial judge must find a confession to be voluntary before submitting it to a juryss it subsequently held that the issue of voluntariness need not be resolved
outside of the presence of the jury.'" The Summitt court found
that holding to be pertinent and thus allowed the admissibility
of identification evidence to be determined in the jury's
presence." 7
E. Confessions
1. Right to Counsel
In Massiah v. United States,"8 a decision predating Miranda, the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment right
to counsel had been violated when government agents surreptitiously recorded a conversation between an indicted defendant
and a coconspirator, with the consent of the coconspirator. A
152. Id.
153. 608 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1979).
154. Id. at 250-51.
155. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
156. Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31 (1967).
157. Judge Merritt, dissenting, preferred to follow United States v.
Driber, 546 F.2d 18 (3d Cir. 1976), and suggested requiring a hearing on the
admissibility of identification evidence outside the presence of the jury, unless
the request for a hearing was frivolous, 608 F.2d at 254 (Merritt, J.,
dissenting).
158. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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substantially similar issue arose in State v. Berry, " in which a

law enforcement officer was covertly placed in jail with the accused, who had been indicted for first degree murder. Counsel
for the accused had contacted the sheriff who, with full knowledge of the arrangements that had been made, promised that
the accused would not be interrogated in the absence of counsel.
Ostensibly, the undercover operation was intended to determine
whether the accused intended to kill a particular law enforcement agent who had played a major role in the investigation. At
the murder trial the undercover agent testified regarding numerous incriminating statements made by the accused. While the
statements had been made in the course of a voluntary conversation with a "tough character" whom the defendant sought to
hire to kill the investigator, the appellate court saw "no essential
difference between this and a normal interrogation wherein a police officer takes a statement from one accused of crime."' 60
Under the authority of Massiah and its recent application in
Brewer v.Williams,"" the court concluded that the accused had
been denied the right to counsel"" and that the conviction
therefore must be reversed.
2. Interrogation
The Miranda requirements are only pertinent to incriminating statements elicited by interrogation. 6 A frequently recognized exception to Miranda is the voluntary statement rule.'"
159. 592 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. 1980).
160. Id. at 556.
161. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
162. 592 S.W.2d at 561.
All will agree that had the officer entered the cell, identified himself,
and asked questions which produced incriminating information, such
information would not have been admissible. The law will not permit
law enforcement officials to do by ruse, trickery, deceit and deception
that which it is not permitted to do openly and honestly. Nor will the
law permit the State to dishonor its commitment and renege on its
promise to defendant's counsel.

Id.
163. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
164. "Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling
influences is . . .admissible in evidence." Id. at 478. See, e.g., People v. Mer-
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Interrogation is not confined, however, to dialogues between officials and defendants in which the officials' statements are followed by question marks; interrogation may be subtle as well as
explicit."
Whether an exchange amounted to interrogation was the
dispositive issue before the Supreme Court in Rhode Island V.
Innis.'" Innis had been arrested, unarmed, shortly after he had
purportedly robbed a taxicab driver with a sawed-off shotgun.
After receiving his Miranda rights, Innis indicated that he
wished to speak to an attorney. On the way to the stationhouse,
two of the officers accompanying the accused expressed concern
about the missing shotgun, particularly because a school for
handicapped children was located near the scene of the alleged
crime. One officer expressed the fear that " 'there's a lot of
handicapped children running around in this area, and God forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and. . .might
hurt themselves.' "
The accused interrupted the conversation
and told the officers to turn the car around so that he could direct them to the place where he had hidden the shotgun. At trial
the accused sought to suppress the shotgun and his statements
about its location as products of a violation of his Miranda
rights. The trial court, without addressing the question whether
an interrogation had occurred, ruled that the accused had
waived his right to remain silent. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court set aside the conviction, relying in part on Brewer v. Williams' 0 for the conclusion that the accused had invoked his
right to counsel and thereafter had been interrogated without
first waiving the right to counsel.""

cer, 257 Cal. App. 2d 244, 246, 64 Cal. Rptr. 861, 863 (1967) (escaping prisoner's statement "I did it. No one else was involved" when stopped by officer
was voluntary); People v. Leffew, 58 Mich. App. 533, 536, 228 N.W.2d 449, 451
(1975) (suspect's statement about rings he was wearing when stopped by officer
was voluntary); Commonwealth v. Whitman, 252 Pa. Super. 66, 71-72, 380 A.2d
1284, 1287 (1977) (suspect's statement that he committed the robbery but did
not shoot anyone held to be voluntary).
165. Commonwealth v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 252 P.2d 575 (1969).
166. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). See generally 48 TENN. L. Rxv. 785 (1981).

167. Id. at 294 (quoting the trial transcript).
168. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
169. The Supreme Court's summary of the lower court's proceedings can
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The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the state court
and remanded the case. The Court acknowledged that interrogation was not limited to express questioning of an accused.
"[T]he term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of

the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."'7 0 Applying
this standard, the Court concluded that no interrogation occurred in the present case, because the "conversation was, at
least in form, nothing more than a dialogue between the two officers to which no response from the respondent was invited." 1"
The Court also found that there was no reason for the officers to
believe that their conversation would likely elicit an incriminating response.
The facts surrounding the incriminating statement in Innis
are remarkably similar to those in Brewer. In Brewer officers
transporting an accused who was suspected of murdering a child
expressed regrets that the body might not be found prior to an
impending snowfall, and, therefore, might not receive a "Christian burial."''" The accused, known to be vulnerable to such religious appeals, directed the officers to the place where he had
hidden the body. The Court in Brewer held that the statements
of the accused were inadmissible because they were obtained in
violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel. The Brewer
decision was dismissed as irrelevant in a footnote in Innis on the
ground that in Brewer formal charges had been brought and
therefore the right to counsel had attached and had been invoked.'17 By contrast, in Innis formal charges had not yet been
instigated, and what right to counsel the accused had was derivative of the fifth amendment protection accorded by Miranda.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented,
expressing agreement with the Court's definition of "interrogation" but disagreeing with the application of the definition in

be found in 446 U.S. at 296-97.
170. Id. at 301 (footnotes omitted).
171. Id.at 302.
172. 430 U.S. at 392-93.
173. 446 U.S. at 300 n.4.
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the Innis case. 1 4 Justice Stevens' dissent suggested three ways
in which the officer might have expressed his apprehension:
He could have:
(1) directly asked Innis:
Will you please tell me where the shotgun is so we can
protect handicapped school children from danger?
(2) announced to the other officers in the wagon:
If the man sitting in the back seat with me should decide
to tell us where the gun is, we can protect handicapped children from danger.
or

(3) stated to the other officers:
It would be too bad if a little handicapped girl would pick
up the gun that this man left in the area and maybe kill
herself.1"'
The dissent viewed the first statement clearly to be interrogation. The third statement-essentially what had occurred-was
not interrogation according to the majority. Justice Marshall was
persuaded that the second statement also would not satisfy the
definition as interpreted by the majority since it was not a direct
question and it would not be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.176 Such diverse results, in the view of Stevens' dissent, are arbitrary "because all three [statements] appear to be designed to elicit a response from anyone who in fact
knew where the gun was located." 1 7
3. Silence as Impeachment
The silence of the accused following the Miranda warnings
may not be used to impeach his testimony, because the warnings
inform him of his right not to speak.""5 This principle is not applicable, however, to prearrest silence. In Jenkins v. Anderson""
the accused, charged with first degree murder, maintained that
he had acted in self-defense. At trial the prosecution established
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 312 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 312 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
447 U.S. 231 (1980).
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that the accused was not apprehended until two weeks following
the killing and suggested, in closing argument, that the accused
would have spoken out sooner if he had killed in self-defense.
The Supreme Court held that the use of the accused's prearrest
silence for purposes of impeachment did not violate the privilege
against self-incrimination protected by the fifth amendment or
fundamental fairness protected by the due process clause. Unlike silence following the Miranda warnings, "[iln this case, no
governmental action induced petitioner to remain silent before
arrest."' "
4.

Inconsistent Statements as Impeachment

The United States Supreme Court held in Doyle v.Ohio"'
that the silence of the accused at the time of his arrest and after
receipt of his Miranda warnings could not be used to impeach
his trial testimony. The accused had given an exculpatory story
on direct examination and on cross-examination was asked why
he had not offered this explanation to the arresting officer. In
Charles v. Anderson" ' the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was
concerned with the application of Doyle to an accused who did
not remain silent but made a statement inconsistent with his
trial testimony. The prosecution maintained that since the accused had not asserted the privilege against self-incrimination,
the cross-examination was "a legitimate attempt to explore this
inconsistency. "I" The court concluded that Doyle applied and
then distinguished several cases in which prior statements had
been used to demonstrate inconsistency with trial testimony."'
In Charles the court viewed the cross-examination as focusing
upon the silence of the accused-the failure to offer the explanation testified to on direct examination." Judge Merritt, dissenting, found nothing in Doyle to suggest that the Supreme Court
180. Id. at 240.
181. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
182. 610 F.2d 417 (6th Cir. 1979).
183. Id. at 420.

184. United States v. Mireles, 570 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1978); Twyman v.
Oklahoma, 560 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1071 (1978);
United States v.Mitchell, 558 F.2d 1332 (8th Cir. 1977).
185. 610 F.2d at 421-22.
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would have reached the same result had the accused made an
inconsistent statement at the time of the arrest.1"
F. Prosecutorial Vindictiveness
In a series of cases the United States Supreme Court has
disapproved governmental action that was apparent retaliation
for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. In North
Carolina v. Pearce1 7 the Court found that imposing a greater
sentence on retrial when a conviction has been overturned and
when no legitimate reason for the increase existed was a deprivation of due process. In Blackledge v. Perry'"1 the Pearce
principle was applied to a prosecutor's increase in the severity of
the charges after the accused demanded a trial de novo on appeal. Conversely, in Bordenkircher v. HayesS" the Court found
nothing inappropriate when the prosecution obtained an additional indictment against the accused after he refused to plead
guilty, viewing this as part of the "'give-and-take' "
of plea
bargaining.
In United States v. Andrews"' the accused were indicted
for narcotics and firearms offenses and, at the request of the
prosecution, were denied bail. The ruling was appealed, and the
accused were admitted to bail. Thereafter, the prosecution obtained additional indictments for conspiracy. The accused
sought to have these charges dismissed on the ground that they
represented a retaliation to the exercise of their constitutional
right to bail. The federal district court granted the motion and
dismissed the conspiracy count"1 because of the appearance of
vindictiveness. The court ruled that a superseding indictment
would be legitimate only if, without fault of the Government,
changed circumstances or newly discovered evidence were
present.

186. Id. at 424 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
187. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
188. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
189. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
190. Id. at 362 (quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809
(1970)).
191. 612 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1979).
192. 444 F. Supp. 1238 (E.D.Mich. 1978).
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment
and concluded that the "appearance of vindictiveness" standard
was not compelled by the United States Supreme Court decisions."19 The court noted that in both Pearce and Blackledge
"there was a substitution of charges-the same conduct on the
part of the defendant was the basis for the diverse sentences imposed in Pearce and underlie both the misdemeanor and felony
charges in Blackledge.'" In Andrews the conspiracy charge was
separate and distinct from the original charges on the substantive crimes. Thus, the court noted that in Pearce "the sentencing court [had] made a final decision as to the appropriate
punishment for the offense of which the defendant was convicted;" '19 5 in Blackledge, the conduct would "support only a single charge, with the prosecution having the option of charging
the defendant under different provisions of the law carrying varying penalties." 1 "0 Under either of those circumstances and absent any explanation, the more punitive action smacked of vindictiveness. In Andrews, however, as in Bordenkircher, "when
the defendants were charged with the two substantive offenses
the full extent of prosecutorial judgment and/or discretion had
7
not been exercised.""U9
Relying primarily upon decisions from the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals that addressed the issue of prosecutorial vindictiveness," the court indicated that its concern was with "the
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness in the prosecutor's conduct,
. . .bearing in mind that resolution of such issue must take into
account a reasonable apprehension of retaliatory motivation on
the part of the defendant."'" The Andrews court envisioned
three possibilities: (1) If the prosecution substitutes charges,
thereby increasing the severity of the potential punishment, a
prima facie case of vindictiveness is presented that may be rebutted by proof that intervening circumstances, of which the

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
little, 558
199.

612 F.2d at 238.
Id. at 240-41.
Id. at 241.
Id.
Id.
Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978); Hardwick v. DooF.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977).
612 F.2d at 244 (citation omitted).
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prosecution could not reasonably have been aware, warranted
the charge; 00 (2) if new charges relatively distinct from the original charges are added, then the accused must show actual vindictiveness even though "a prima facie case may be made out of
the mere fact of the added charge if no plausible explanation is
offered by the prosecution"; 01 and (3) if a new charge is added
"for a different and distinct offense which was a different and
distinct consequence of the same basic conduct underlying the
original charge,"'' a prima facie case of vindictiveness would
arise "subject to rebuttal by the prosecution offering evidence of
facts that reasonably explain or justify the action taken and negate any inference of vindictiveness in fact." 05 The court noted
that the standard placed primary emphasis on the apprehension
of retaliatory motivation in the first example, the intent of the
prosecutor in the second, and both in the third.'"

200.

Id.

201.

Id.

202. Id. at 245.
203. Id. (footnote omitted).
204. Id. at 244-45.
Judge Merritt, concurring, found the vindictiveness concept "unmanageable" and concluded that, in light of Bordenkircher, "the kind of vindictive
behavior proscribed by the due process clause relates to double jeopardy values
and . . . the concept is limited to prosecutorial vindictiveness after the first

trial is over." Id. at 247 (Merritt, J., corcurring).
Judge Keith, dissenting, favored a balancing approach:
A court should first decide as a threshold matter whether a prosecutor's action in seeking a heavier second indictment appears to be vindictive. If so, the court should examine the facts and weigh the extent
to which allowing the second indictment will chill defendant's exercise
of the right in question with the extent to which forbidding the second indictment infringes on the prosecutor's charging authority. If the
balance falls in favor of the defendant, then the government would
have a heavy burden of offsetting the appearance of vindictiveness. If
the balance favors the government then there would arise a primafacie case of vindictiveness, but all the government need do is provide
neutral explanations to demonstrate that it did not, in fact, act
vindictively.
Id. at 252 (Keith, J., dissenting).
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G.

Trial by Jury

1. Discrimination in Selection
The sixth amendment right to trial by jury requires that
juries "be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community."' 0 While the issue of a fair cross-section usually has
arisen in cases involving claims of exclusion on the basis of
race'"o or national origin, 0 7 the constitutional requirement is not
so limited. The test was articulated in Duren v. Missouri:'
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-crosssection requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the
group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the
community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires
from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and
(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion
of the group in the jury-selection process. 2'
In State v. Nelson 10 the accused sought a reversal of his conviction on the ground that members of a local group known as
"The Farm" were not included on the master jury list and therefore were not included in the grand jury that indicted him or in
the panel from which his trial jury was selected. The Farm was a
religious commune that previously had been involved in a criminal prosecution for the propagation of marijuana. The conviction
of its leader for the manufacture of marijuana had been sustained by the Tennessee Supreme Court.'' By the time of the
trial in Nelson, approximately 1,100 people including 700 adults
were living on the Farm. The court described the group as a
religious community of people dedicated to a common set of
spiritual beliefs. The Farm is substantially autonomous, in that
it is agriculturally self-sufficient and maintains its own school
for the education of Farm children. The Farm also controls the

205.
206.
207.
208.

Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
439 U.S. 357 (1979).

209.

Id. at 364.

210.
211.

603 S.W.2d 158 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980).
Gaskin v. State, 490 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. 1973).
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ingress and egress of all outsiders, as well as that of its own
members. In this sense, the group is somewhat self segregated

from the mainstream of Lewis County life."'

Many of the members of the sect worked outside the commune,
and more than half of those eligible had registered to vote. Nevertheless, the trial judge had concluded that the group "'walled
themselves away from the mainstream of socio-economic political structure and activity'" of the county and therefore "'were

not part of a viable or even a prima facie cross section of Lewis
County.' "I'll
The question under the Duren test, however, was, first,

whether those excluded formed a "distinctive group,""'

a point

conceded by the trial court. The second Duren requirement,
under-representation in venires, was easily satisfied in Nelson by

the absolute exclusion of the Farm members from jury service,
even though they constituted approximately twelve percent of

the population of the county."1 The statistical disparity also was
sufficient to satisfy the third requirement-systematic exclusion

from jury selection.'" Moreover, the court found direct evidence
of systematic exclusion. The statutory requirement that potential jurors be "known for their integrity, fair character and

sound judgment"' " 7 was misinterpreted to require jurors to be
personally known by the jury commissioners."' Such practice

had been held explicitly unconstitutional forty years earlier in
Smith v.Texas.'"

212. 603 S.W.2d at 162 (footnote omitted).
213. Id. at 163 (quoting the trial judge's holding).
214. The court adopted the criteria for cognizable groups articulated in
United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143-44 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 468 F.2d
1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973): "(1) the presence of
some quality or attribute which defines and limits the group; (2) a cohesiveness
of attitudes or ideas or experience which distinguishes the group from the general social milieu; and (3) a community of interests which may not be represented by other segments of society." 603 S.W.2d at 163.
215. Id. at 164.
216. Id. at 165.
217. TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-228(a) (1955) (currently codified as TENN.
CODE ANN. § 22-2-302(a) (1980 Repl.)).
218. 603 S.W.2d at 166.
219. 311 U.S. 128 (1940). "Where jury commissioners limit those from
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A prima facie case of discrimination thus established, the
burden in Nelson shifted to the prosecution to prove that a
significant state interest was served by the exclusion. In the absence of any proof the court concluded that the indictments
should have been dismissed and the jury venire quashed. Finally, the court recommended the adoption of the key number
system in order to avoid the constitutional vulnerability of subjective criteria in the selection process 3O
2.

Separation of Jury

From an early date, Tennessee courts have held it improper
to separate the jurors during the course of a felony trial. When
the jurors are separated, the burden of proof rests with the prosecution to show an absence of prejudice.""
The law on jury separation was summarized in Hines v.
State:"'
The principles laid down in these cases are, 1. That the
fact of separation having been established by the prisoner, the
possibility that the juror has been tampered with, and has received other impressions than those derived from the testimony in court, exists, and prima facie, the verdict is vicious;
but 2nd this separation may be explained by the prosecution,
showing that the juror had no communication with other persons, or that such communication was upon subjects foreign to
the trial, and that in fact, no impressions, other than those
drawn from the testimony, were made upon his mind. But 3. In
the absence of such explanation, the mere fact of separation is
sufficient ground for a new trial."'
Given the presumption favoring the defense on this issue, a
whom grand juries are selected to their own personal acquaintance, discrimination can arise from commissioners who know no negroes as well as from commissioners who know but eliminate them." Id. at 132.
220. 603 S.W.2d at 167.
221. Hickerson v. State, 141 Tenn. 502, 213 S.W. 917 (1919); Long v.
State, 132 Tenn. 649, 179 S.W. 315 (1915); Sherman v. State, 125 Tenn. 19, 140
S.W. 209 (1911); Cartwright v. State, 80 Tenn. 620 (1883); Hines v. State, 27

Tenn. 597 (1848); MLain v. State, 18 Tenn. 241 (1837).
222. 27 Tenn. 597 (1848).
223. Id. at 602.
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new trial would appear to be unavoidable whenever potentially
prejudicial influence is shown. Such was the case in Gonzales v.
State." 4 The Gonzales defendants were charged with felonious
child abuse.' 5 The jury had been sequestered the first evening
of the trial, and seven members expressed an interest in voting
in an election held the second day of the trial. It was clear that
the case could not be completed before the polls closed, so the
judge informed counsel that he intended to permit the jury to
return to their homes for the evening after instructing them in a
strong admonition to avoid all newspaper, radio, and television
accounts of the trial. Both defendants opposed jury separation
in light of the widespread publicity given the case. Nevertheless,
the trial judge permitted the jurors to return to their homes.
The following morning the trial judge asked the jurors if any of
them had read or heard anything that would affect their ability
to render an impartial verdict in the case. Defense counsel was
permitted to question the jurors regarding their exposure to any
information through the media or through personal contacts regarding the case. None of the jury confessed to any untoward
events. "
After their conviction for felonious child abuse, the defendants moved for a new trial, contending that on the evening the
jury was separated, a motion picture entitled "Sybil," which depicted child abuse, was aired on a local television station. According to a witness for the defense, "the movie depicted vivid
scenes of abuse administered by a mother upon her daughter of
tender years and the resulting adverse affect [sic] upon the
child's personality in later years.'! 7 There was, however, no evidence that any of the jurors had actually viewed the movie.""

224. 573 S.W.2d 288 (Tenn. 1980). See generally 48

TENN.

L. REV. 146

(1980).
225. The statute under which the defendants were charged was Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-601(b)(4) (Supp. 1978).
226. 593 S.W.2d at 289-90.
227. Id. at 290.
228. At the reconvening of the trial, "neither the trial judge nor defense
counsel asked any specific questions about what the jurors saw on television, if
anything." Id. At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, defense counsel
had told the court that they had not learned about the airing of the motion
picture until after the trial. Id.

19811
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Nevertheless, the supreme court concluded that the possibility
of prejudice clearly was established,"" and "[w]hen the evidence
of that possibility for prejudicial impressions was presented the
burden was imposed upon the State to show that the jurors were
not exposed to the movie 'Sybil', or if exposed that it had no
prejudicial effect upon them.""' 0 In the absence of such proof by
the State, the decision was reversed and the case was remanded
for a new trial.
H. Punishment
1. Disproportionality
Courts traditionally have been reluctant to examine claims
of disproportionality between punishment and offense."'1 The

conventional view has been that a sentence falling within the
statutory limits is constitutional.3 2 In Rummel v. Estelle"" the
United States Supreme Court sustained the application of the
Texas recidivist statute that imposed a mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment upon an accused convicted of three nonviolent
theft offenses in which the total amount stolen was $229."' The
majority simply held that "the point at which a recidivist will be
deemed to have demonstrated the necessary propensities and
the amount of time that the recidivist will be isolated from society are matters largely within the discretion of the punishing
jurisdiction.'"s
229. "It is beyond question that 'Sybil' conveyed impressions potentially
prejudicial to defendants in this case and that the nature of the charges were
such as were 'likely to excite the commuunity against them.'" Id. at 293.
230. Id.
231.

See generally J. COOK, CONsTrruMONAL

RIGHTS oF THE

Ac-

CUSED--POST-TRIAL RIGHTS § 6 (1976).
232. See Hardin v. State, 210 Tenn. 116, 355 S.W.2d 105 (1962); French
v. State, 489 S.W.2d 57 (Tenn. Crim. App.), cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1972).
233. 100 S. Ct. 1133 (1980).
234. Id. at 1134-35. The defendant had been convicted of fraudulent use

of a credit card to obtain $80 in goods and services, passing a forged check for
$28.36, and obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. Id.
235. Id. at 1145. Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall,

and Stevens, dissented.
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2. Habitual Criminal
The Tennessee Habitual Criminal Statute enhances punishment for an offense to life imprisonment upon proof of three
prior convictions "for separate offenses, committed at different
times, and on separate occasions."'" In Clayborne v. State""
the accused and a companion used a gun to take two leather
jackets from a shop. From the shop, they ran to an apartment
complex and, again at gunpoint, deprived another individual of
his automobile. The prosecution maintained that the two offenses were not committed simultaneously and were not directly
related; therefore, they should qualify as separate offenses for
purposes of the habitual criminal statute. The court disagreed
and concluded that "[tlhe two felonies were committed on one
occasion";"' thus, the statutory requirement that separate offenses be committed at different times was not met."'
I. Probation
In State v. King"40 the accused pleaded guilty to public
drunkenness and to carrying a dangerous weapon with intent to
go armed. The trial court sentenced him to two six-month
sentences to run concurrently, but credited him with time already served' 4' and suspended the remainder of the sentence.

The state appealed, contending that suspension of the sentence
was improper, because the trial judge had failed, as required by
statute,'4 'to order and consider a probation report and to state
reasons for granting probation. The Tennessee Court of CrimiT'ENN. Cotm ANN. § 40-2801 (1975).
237. 596 S.W.2d 820 (Tenn. 1980).
238. Id. at 821.
239. Id. at 821-22. The supreme court noted that the court of criminal
appeals, in reaching the same conclusion, had relied upon Frazier v. State, 485
S.W.2d 877 (Tenn. 1972), in which five burglaries committed against separate
tenants in the same building on the same day were counted as one offense for
purposes of the habitual criminal act. Id. at 821.
240. 603 S.W.2d 721 (Tenn. 1980).
241. The trial court gave the credit in accordance with Tennessee Code
Annotated § 40-3102 (1975), which provides that "[t]he trial court shall ...
allow the defendant credit on his sentence for any period of time for which he

236.

was committed and held ...

242. Id. § 40-2904.

pending his arraignment and trial."
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nal Appeals ruled that these statutory requirements did not apply to a subsequent statute that granted trial judges wide discretion in suspending sentences without imposing probation.4 The
Tennessee Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that the provisions must be read in pari materia, and that the subsequent
statute was only concerned "with the time frame within which
trial judges may exercise the power to suspend sentences,"""
and not with the manner in which eligibility for suspension was
to be determined. The court further held that, contrary to the
judgment of the trial court, under the pertinent statute'" "there
can be no suspension of a sentence without probation.""' While
the appellate court had concluded that it would be absurd to
require a probation report in every case in which sentence was
suspended,47 the supreme court responded, first, that this was
simply what the statutes required, and second, that it previously
had held that a probation report was not required if a probation
officer was unavailable. 46 In such cases, "the relevant factors to
be considered in granting or denying suspension of sentence
and
24
probation . . . should be fully developed at the hearing.' '
An abuse of discretion in the denial of probation may constitute reversible error."0 For such a result, the appellate court
must find "that the record contains no substantial evidence to
support the conclusion of the trial court that the defendant is
not entitled to probation or suspended sentence."'125 In State v.

Barber 5 ' the accused was convicted of selling one ounce of marijuana to an undercover agent. Because of the continuing undercover investigation, he was not arrested for the offense until
twenty months later. The record indicated that the accused had
"ceased his unlawful activities within days of the sale, and [had]
243. Id. § 40-2903.
244. 603 S.W.2d at 724.
245. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2901 & -2902 (1975).
246. 603 S.W.2d at 725.
247. Id.
248. Id. The court referred to an earlier case, State v. Welch, 565 S.W.2d
492 (Tenn. 1978), to support its conclusion.
249. 603 S.W.2d at 725 (citation omitted).
250. State v. Grear, 568 S.W.2d 285 (Tenn. 1978).
251. Id. at 286.
252. 595 S.W.2d 809 (Tenn. 1980).
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lived the life of an example citizen in the twenty months between the sale and his arrest."" 3- Finding that the accused's record was in all other respects honorable,'" the court concluded
that his rehabilitation without incarceration made him an "ideal
prospect for probation,"" 5 and the denial of the request for probation was, therefore, an abuse of discretion.
J. Double Jeopardy
1. Multiple Offenses
In a long line of cases Tennessee courts have held that only
one conviction may result when an accused simultaneously injures more than one person with a single act.' In the leading
case, Smith v. State,"7 the accused struck two people with his
automobile, killing one and injuring the other. The court held
that convictions of both manslaughter and assault and battery
could not stand, because the facts showed "a single transaction,
involving a single criminal intent.""'
Smith was overruled in State v. Irvin.25' The court concluded that the analysis in the prior decisions "improperly
focuse[d] upon the fictional 'intent' of the accused rather than
upon the elements of the criminal offense with which he is
charged." "6 While all the cases reviewed by the court that had
applied the Smith rule involved assaults with motor vehicles,""
253.
254.

Id. at 810.
He has no prior criminal record, his military service was honor-

able, his social history is without blemish other than the conviction
under consideration, he is working and supporting his wife and her
four children . . . his work record is good, and there is no adverse
reference in the record to either his mental or physical condition.
Id. at 810-11.
255. Id. at 811.
256. Crocker v. State, 204 Tenn. 615, 325 S.W.2d 234 (1959); Huffman v.
State, 200 Tenn. 487, 292 S.W.2d 738 (1956); Smith v. State, 159 Tenn. 674, 21

S.W.2d 400 (1929).
257. 159 Tenn. 674, 21 S.W.2d 400 (1929).
258. Id. at 681, 21 S.W.2d at 402.
259. 603 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn. 1980).
260. Id. at 123.
261. Id. The specific overruling of Smith was narrow: "It is overruled insofar as it purports to hold that there can be only one conviction when there
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the Irvin holding would appear to be applicable to all instances
26
of multiple criminal results from a single act.
2.

Guilty Plea

In Rivers v. Lucas' 5 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a defendant indicted for first degree murder who
pleaded guilty to manslaughter could not be prosecuted for murder after the manslaughter conviction was set aside without violating the prohibition against double jeopardy. The court reasoned that by accepting a guilty plea to a lesser included offense,
the trial court made a determination equivalent to a jury's refusal to convict for the greater offense.'
The court concluded in Hawk v. Berkemer"' that the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Scott"' required that
Rivers be overruled. In Scott the trial court erroneously had dismissed two of three counts of an indictment at the end of the
proof on the ground of prejudicial preindictment delay. The jury
acquitted on the third count. The Supreme Court held that the
accused could be retried on the counts that were dismissed erroneously. The Court reasoned that "a defendant is acquitted only
when 'the ruling of a judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution . . ., correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.' ,,267 In Hawk the court
concluded that "[tjhis [reasoning] flatly conflicts with Rivers'
idea of an implicit acquittal," 2" and therefore that the Rivers
holding must be disregarded.

are multiple victims of a vehicular accident involving criminal conduct." Id.
262. "It seems illogical to us, as a general proposition, to hold that when
two persons have been killed by an accused, he has committed only one homicide." Id. at 123. Clearly, the decision is not limited to multiple homicides, for
such a holding would not have necessitated the overruling of Smith.
263. 477 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 896
(1976).
264. 477 F.2d at 202.
265.
266.
267.
U.S. 564,
268.

610 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1979).
437 U.S. 82 (1978).
Id. at 97 (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430
571 (1977)).
610 F.2d at 447.

